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Summary
RESTRICTION OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION:
THE EFFECTS ON THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY
by
David G. tlartman
This paper examines the argument that restricting domestic firms' production
abroad by for example, imposing a tax on foreign source income, can increase
domestic welfare and alter the income distribution to favor labor. These argu-
ents follow directly from a characterization of the international producer as
a facilitator of capital flows. The available evidence suggests, however, that
U.S. multinational firms have a much broader role than transferring abundant
U.S. capital abroad. In this paper the firm Is viewed as able to compete
abroad for a variety of reasons, including an ability to make use of technological
and other cost advantages over local producers. Then, the effect of its opera-
tions abroad on the domestic capital stock is no longer so obvious. It is
argued that at most a part of the marginal capital employed abroad is obtained at
the expense of the capital stock of the domestic economy. The paper then presents
a simple model which indicates that domestic labor can either gain or lose
relative to capital, and home country welfare can either increase or decline, as
a result of restricting the foreign operations of domestic firms. The results
depend on the ultimate source of the capital placed abroad, the relative factor
intensity of production by the multinational firm, and whether the multinational
firm produces the home country's importable or exportable good. Since none of
the cases considered seems totally implausible, the case for reducing international








For a number of years, a minority of the United States Congress has been
urging adoption of measures to reduce the level of foreign operations of U.S.-
based firms. The discussions have centered on a more restrictive policy of
incometaxation, but proposals for more direct restriction of foreign invest-
ment have also been advanced. Organized labor has given strong support to such
policy changes, arguing that workers are harmed by the employment abroad of U.S.
capital and know-how. Their position is holstered by the long-held theory of
economists that national welfare can be improved by the appropriate reduction
in foreign investment from its free-market level.
Labor's case for restricting the firms' foreign operations is often
expressed in terms of a loss in home country jobs. Several studies, which are
reviewed in Bergsten, et al (1978), estimate the net effect on employment of U.S.
foreign investment. Since the loss of jobs is a temporary adjustment problem
and also depends on government macroeconomic policies, these estimates are
difficult to interpret. Other authors have, however, pointed to a more permanent
impact on labor, the reduction in wages caused by the decline in the home country's
capital-labor ratio which results as capital moves abroad.1
There are two distinct strands to the national welfare argument for restric-
ting the foreign production of U.S. firms.2 The first depends on the existence
of host country taxes on the income earned in the host country by U.S. firms.
Profit-maximizing firms, it is argued, will equate marginal returns to capital, net
of U.S. and host country taxes,across all countries in which they operate.
This implies that under the current system of crediting foreign tax payments
against the U.S. income tax liability, the U.S. earns less, by the amount of the
foreign tax, on the marginal unit of capital placed abroad than it would if the2
capital were to remain at home. That is, firms transfer toomuch capital abroad
from the standpoint of national welfare; the U.S. would do well to reduce the
level of foreign investment. Taking into account only this "foreign tax effect",
it would appear that home country welfare could ho maximized by allowing a
deduction, rather than a credit, for foreign taxpayments.3
Other writers have pointed to a second source of gain.to the home country
fromrestrictingforeign investment. They have argued that the home country can
increase its earnings on the stock of capital employed abroad by insuring that a
higher, not equal, return is earned at the margin on capital placed abroad.
Achieving this monopoly gain requires government intervention, of course, only
if the home country firms themselves do not act as a monopoly supplier of capital
(cfJasay (1960)).In other cases even a home country system of "taxation with
deduction of foreign taxes" is apparently insufficiently restrictive from the
standpoint of home country welfare. Thurow (1976) uses this argument as a basis
for estimating the gain available to the U.S. from "optimal taxation" of the
income earned abroad by U.S. firms.
The grounds on whichgovernment restriction of firm's foreign investment
has been proposed are, then, that such a restriction is thought to alter the home
country's income distribution in favor of labor and to improve home country welfare
in general. Both arguments, as just described, rely crucially on a characteriza-
tion of the multinational firmasa transferor of domestic capitalabroad.4 It
seems curious that this view of the firms has persisted in discussions of optimal
policy, as accumulating evidence seems to contradict the notion that capital
transfers play a major role.3
Critics of the hypothesis that foreign investors operate primarily to
facilitate capital flows include Hymer (1960), Vernon (1966), Gruber, etal
(1967), Caves (1971), and Horst (1972). This criticism is supported by recent
evidence. The rapidly growing flows of portfolio capital and direct investnt
into the U.S. argues against the view that U.S. firms are investing abroad
primarily to take advantage of an abundance of capital at home. Also, a
substantial fraction of the capital employed abroad by U.S. firms is obtained
outside the U.S.
The effects of government restrictions on the foreign operations of firms
have previously been studied using an overly simplistic characterization of the
multinational firm. This paper takes a broader view of the nature of the firm's
foreign operations, allowing for a variety of factors, including technological
and managerial advantages over local producers, which may explain the firm's
competitiveness abroad. The policy conclusions which result differ substantially
from those of the traditional analysis. Specifically, both the usual national
welfare and distribution arguments for restricting production abroad are shown
to hold only in particular cases.
The impact of restrictive government policies on the domestic capital stock
is a highly important factor in our analysis. Having rejected the traditional
approach to determining the effect of foreign investment on the domestic capital
stock, it is necessary to formulate an alternative. So, before considering the
policy issues, we address the question of whether the domestic capital stock is
affected by international production decision.4
II. The Impact of Foreign Investment on the International Distribution of Capital
In examining this crucial issue of the source of capital employed abroad by
*iltinational firms,itis only the ultimate source in the aggregate that is of
interest. For that reason, the individual firm's decision on how to finance its
investment is not of concern here. Furthermore, even the observed aggregate
financial behavior of multinational firms may not have relevance in this context.
For example, if there were compensating long-term portfolio capital flows
which were perfectly interest-elastic, the worldwide distribution of real capital
would be unaffected by the financial decisions of firms, even in the aggregate.
In this case of perfectly elastic capital flows, the issues of policies towards
capital movements and the remainder of a multinational firm's operations would
be separable .Sincethe effects on the home economy of restricting capital
flows have been examined in detail,5 only the impacts of a change in the level of
foreign production would remain to be explored. While we will consider, as a
special case, the restriction of international production when no change in the
capital stock takes place, there are a number of reasons for believing that the
operations of multinational firms do affect the distribution of capital across
nations. That is, the international character of total assets held by the home
country is altered as the level of international production changes.
One factor of importance is the ability of multinational fi.rms to overcome
barriers to capital mobility. The existence of barriers to portfolio capital
flows has been described as providing an additional advantage to the multinational
firm. The multinational firm is favored because of its ability to transfer funds
internally without being required to engage in market transactions. This ability
is particularly advantageous if local capital markets are inefficient or non-
existent or if government interference with capital transactions is pervasive.5
Clearly, if multinational firms perform this arbitrage function to any significant
extent, their operations' impact on the capital stocks of the nations in which
they operate cannot be ignored. Discussions of the ability of multinational
firms to facilitate capital flows can be found in Agmon and Lessard (1977) and
Rugman (1977).
A second factor tending to result in the domestic capital stock and the level
of international production not being separable issues is uncertainty. Not wanting
to be dependent upon any assumption that risk is a matter of concern to individual
firms, we will look through the corporation to the desire of individuals who own
shares in the firm's returns to minimize the riskiness of their portfolios.
A convenient way of attacking the issue of capital transfer is to question whether
firm owners, when faced with an increased Incentive to employ capital abroad (in
order to increase production), would increase net borrowing abroad in equal amount
to the capital requirement of the production increase.6 The answer, in general,
is that a portion of the required capital is obtained at the expense of the home
country's capital stock.
Borrowing in the host country requires that the capital return be paid in
the local currency. Individuals are concerned about the correlation of real
returns to assets with real costs of holding liabilities in their portfolios.
So, the attractiveness of increased local borrowing by U.S. investors depends
on the relationship between unexpected changes in the dollar return to capital
employed abroad and unanticipated changes in the exchange rate. The incentive
to obtain a marginal unit of capital locally is smaller the more likely are unan-
ticipated exchange rate changes to reflect fluctuations in input and output prices
faced by the multinational firm in the host country. Since the available evidence6
points to relative prices being affected by exchange rate changes, except over
a very long period (Dornbusch and Krugman (1976) and Krugman (1978)), there is
a clear reason for firms to obtain capital locally. On the other hand, the
possibility of an unanticipated inflation at home being reflected in exchange
rates makes capital transfer relatively less risky. Further complicating decisions
is the possibility of government interference in exchange markets.
To the extent that U.S. multinational firms are superior vehicles for
international portfolio transactions, the capital transfer from the U.S. which
accompanies aggregate investment overseas may be indicative of the overall effect.
rt has been observed that about half of the capital from sources external to
foreign affiliates of U.S. firmsisobtained outside the U.S. at the margin.7
This fraction appears to have been relatively stable, except for periods of
government intervention. So, both the traditional view that the home country's
capital stock declines by the amount of the capital required for an increase in
home country firms' production abroad and the other extreme of no capital transfer
seem to be contradicted in the U.S. case.
It seems safe to assume that investors would not desire that multinational
production be carried out using entirely host country capital at the margin.
Investors in the rest of the world will, similarly, be conscious of risk when
making long-term portfolio capital investments. Therefore, government restrictions
on multinational firms will tend to cause an increase in the home capital stock
which portfolio capital flows will not entirely eliminate. If portfolio capital
flows were perfectly interest-elastic, the national welfare and distribution
questions which motivated this paper would be uninteresting.7
III. The Effects on the Domestic Economy of Reducing the Level of Production
by Domestic Firms Abroad
From the discussion of the previous section, it seems appropriate to take
a new look at the effects of policies toward multinational corporations. Since
our theory suggests that the home economy does not necessarily supply one hundred
percent of the capital used in production abroad, the traditional policy model
is not applicable. We will now explore the implications of the relationship
between capital and international production.
This model will follow the tradition of assuming that there are only two
countries and two traded goods produced with capital and labor available in
fixed supply. Since the results are to be regarded as only illustrative of
possible solutions, free trade without transportation costs is also assumed to
prevail. This assumption precludes, of course, any analysis of simultaneous
restriction of International production and imposition of tariffs.8 The multi-
national firmisviewed as producing one of the goods (X) abroad because of
its advantages over local producers. A policy measure is introduced which
causes production abroad by the home country's firms to decline, with a correspond-






The host country is indicated by a "h"and is the capital required for pro-
ducing a unit of X. Equation (1) allows for the possibility that the restrictive
policy causes a change in the real wage in the host country and, hence, in8
The increase in the home country capital stock which results from the production de-
dine abroad is, then, given by equation (2), where 6 is the fraction of the capital
previously used to produce dX* which returns to the home country.
(2) =
Thismodel is specified assuming that the government simply mandates a reduc-
tion inX*. Other policy measures, such as taxing foreign source income at a higher
rate, could be analyzed in the same way. However, it is useful to consider asimple
reductionin X, as it facilitates examination of two limiting cases of interest.
In addition, we assume that the host economy has imposed no taxes or other restric-
tIon,s on foreign investment. Therefore, the analysis abstracts from the "foreign
tax effect" for simplicity. It causes no confusion, however, to think of any policy
prescriptions following from this discussion as deviations from the basic "taxation
with deduction for foreign tax payments" policy.
With domestic prices and factor costs held fixed, the injection of capital in-






Equation(3) follows from the necessity that all of the additional capital be ab-
sorbed by the production of X or Y, at initial relative factor costs. Therefore,
the total effect on world production of good X, at initial prices, would be given
by equation (4).
* 1 6 *
(4) (dx,+dX) = - dK-X
* a a a a kx a— kyix •kx
kx aly9
The impacts on the domestic economy as prices and factor rewards are allowed
to vary are now usefully explored by considering two polar cases. First, the
analysis is done assuming that all capital formerly used abroad returns to the
domestic economy, and then repeated under the assumption that none of the capital
was used abroad at the expense of the home economy at the margin.
A. Full Capital TransferIn this case, a government-induced reduction
in the production abroad of good X is accompanied by an increase in the
home country's capital stock by the full amount previously used to pro-
duce good X abroad (that is, =1).To determine the effects on prices
of the government's policy, we first examine the fixed-price change in
production of good X.
At the initial relative prices, a capital inflow will increase home
country production of X if X is the home country's capital-intensive good,
and it will decrease if X is relatively labor intensive. With labor
assumed immobile across national borders, the Rybcyzynski theorem dicates
that production of good Y changes in the opposite direction.
In determining the effect of the policy on worldwide production of
X given by (4), the sign of the final term must first be determined. Since
the host country labor which formerly produced dX* must be absorbed by
the host economy without any change in the stock of capital available
for producing the host country good Y, the wage rate in the host country
must decline. Therefore, the last term in (4) is positive.
It is, then, clear that if multinational firms produce the good which
is capital intensive in production in the home country and if the firms do
not use sufficiently less capital-intensive methods abroad, the government's
action results in an increase in the total world production of good X. The
relative price of X must, then decline. By the Stolper-Samuelson theorem,10
the price decline for X leads to a rise in the wage and a decline in
capital's return in line with the traditional conclusion about such a
policy
The exception, just noted, of firms which use significantly less
capital-intensive methods abroad may or may not be of practical importance.
But, since it results from the most traditional case of full capital
transfer, even the theoretical possibility is surprising.
Conversely, if good X is the labor-intensive good in the home economy,
its worldwide production declines in response to a capital repatriation,
as both production at home andabroaddecline (at fixed prices). As a
result, the price of good X must rise, leading to an increase in the home
country's wage-rental ratio.
So, labor will not usually lose relative to capital as a result of
government restriction of international production when all capital used
abroad is obtained at the expense of the home economy. Only if the factor
proportion used in domestic production of good X differs appreciably from
that used abroad,can a counter-intuitive result be obtained.
With respect to national welfare, it is useful to consider two effects
which, while clearly related, will be discussed separately. The first
factor to be considered is the change in the real return to the existing
stock of home country capital abroad. As pointed out above, the wage in
the host country declines unambiguously as a result of a restriction on
foreign investment. So, the return to capital used by producers of X'
increases. Therefore, beginning from a situation of no restrictions on
international production, the imposition of some such restrictive policy
tends to increase U.S. national welfare by raising the return to the stock
of capital held abroad.11
The change in the home country's terms of trade could obviously affect
domestic welfare in either direction depending on the sign of the relative
price change and on which good is the home country's exportable. So,
even in the case of full capital transfer when production of a good abroad
is coupled with the transfer, the implications for national welfare become
ambiguous
B. No Capital TransferWhen no capital employed abroad is obtained at
the expense of the home country capital stock, the cases normally made for
restricting international production are even less clear. Such a govern-
mental policy move causes a reduction in the production of X* abroad,
without any corresponding change in the domestic capital stock. The only
effects on the home country arise, then, because of the relative increase
in the price of X. The resulting (Stolper-Samuelson) effect on the home
country's wage-rental ratio is given by the familiar equation (5).
(5) A P' 1 (w -r)=-j--
Pis the relative price of good X, and el is the determinant of the matrix
havingrepresentative element, 0.., the share of the price of good jwhich
represents a payment to factor i. The sign of let is determined by the
relative factor intensities in the home country. If the good produced
internationally is capital intensive in the home economy, home country
labor will lose when international production is restricted. On the other
hand, restricting production abroad of a good which is labor intensive at
home causes the home country's wage-rental ratio to rise. So, labor's12
traditional argument for reducing the level of operations of multi-
national firms does not necessarily hold.
The national welfare argument gives equally ambiguous conclusions.
Areductionin host country production X does not generally free up capi-
tal andlaborin the correct proportion for production of Y* at existing
factor costs. The wage-rental ratio inthe hosteconomy rises of Y*is
relatively labor intensive, and it fails if *isrelatively capital
intensIve. The real return to the intra.-marginal capital employed abroad
by the home country can, therefore, be changed in either direction by
the government's restrictive policy. Since the relative price of X rises,
the direction of the terms of trade effect on national welfare depends
on whether good X is the Importable or exportable good.
C. Partial Capital Transfer As was pointed out in Section II, the case
of full capital transfer and of no capital transfer are to be regarded as
only limiting cases, with neither likely to have wide applicability.
Since examining the two extreme cases produces such a wide range of possi-
ble results (see Table 1,) we must conclude that a government limitation
on U.S. firms' production abroad could affect both factor rewardsand U.S.
welfare in either direction.
IV. The Need for Further Research
Clearly, the effects of even a very straight-forward policy changecannot
be predicted without a great deal more empirical evidence than is currentlyavailable.
The relative capital intensity of U.S. firms' production abroad is controversial,
with existing studies providing insufficient reason to choose eitheralternative.
Also, while firms often produce abroad as a substitute for exporting, somegoods13
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produced by the firms are imported by the U.S., so the direction of the terms of
trade effect is uncertain. Finally, although the sources of capital employed by
U.S. firms abroad has been studied, this evidence provides at most a partial
answer to the question of effects on the domestic capital stock.
Furthermore, the very simple analysis presented in this paper, although
seemingly more realistic than previous discussions of the issue, falls far short
of the type of model needed to confidently recommend a particular policy. The
analysis, for example, has assumed the initial position to be one of free trade.
Since oneofthe primary reasons given for producing a good abroad is that tariffs
iipede the good's export, one refinement of the basic model would be to include
tariffs. Also, the results hinge critically on the assumptionthat the host
country does not begin production of X as the multinational firms' production de-
clines. Oneattractiveway of including host country production might be to in-
clude more goods which, while not precisely the same as the multinational firms'
production, are close substitutes. The addition of more traded goods could moderate
the results in another way as well. The existence of multiple goods, to which dis-
placed host country labor may flow, may tend to lessen the impact of reduced X'
production on wages. A further extension of the model would allow exploration of
the implications of business being truly multinational, i.e., operating in several
countries.
As with any comparative static analysis, this paper has ignored the process
of adjustment. Since labor's case for restricting international production may
be partially based on the adjustment costs imposed on labor as production shifts
abroad, the adjustment process may be important in a policy decision. However,
any major policy change imposes the same sort of adjustment costs, so the issue is
one of comparative costs.15
Any of these extensions would produce a model with highly complex relation-
ships among variables. Use of such a model would probably require empirical
evidence to be used for obtaining simulation estimates of policy effects. In any
event, the model in this paper must be regarded as illustrative.
V. Conclusions
In a world of foreign exchange risk, some portion of the capital employed
abroad by multinational firms will be obtained locally and some portion will be
transferred from the home country. Since portfolio capital flows, by the same
argument, are not perfectly elastic, the aggregate distribution of capital across
countries is changed as a result of international production, but does not change
by the full amount required by the multinational firms' operations abroad. So,
factor rewards and home country welfare are affected by policies which alter inter-
national production levels, but not necessarily as traditional policy analyses
would Indicate. This paper has shown, using a simple model, that labor can either
gain or lose relative to capital and that the home country welfare can either in-
crease or decline as a result of restricting the foreign operations of home country
firms. Since none of the examples considered seems totally implausible, the case
for reducing multinational activity cannot be made on any of these grounds without
further empirical evidence.16
Footnotes
1.Recent work by P. Musgrave (1975) and Thurow (1976) has provided estimates
of the oss to U.S. labor derived from such an analysis.
2. A more complete review of these discussions can be found in 1ergsten, etal
(1978).
3. This argument is associated with P. Musgrave (1969 and 1975)'.
4.In addition to the studies just cited, thisemphasison capital flows has
dominated studies of optimal host country policy (see, for example, MacDougall
(1960) and Corden (1974)).
S.In addition to the work previously cited, which discussed capital flows as the
characteristic feature of foreign investment by U.S. firms, see Jones (1967).
.Thisincludes, of course, the possibility that individuals would cut previous
net lending abroad.
7. See Hartrnan (1978).
8.In a model of portfolio capital flows, Jones (1967) •considers taxation of both
capital and trade flows.
9. Considering domestic aggregate economic welfare with no concern for the effects
of policy on other nations is, of course, limited as a criterion for policy,
but may be useful nevertheless in describing the policy impacts.17
References
Agmon, T. and D. Lessard, "Investor Recognition of Corporate International
Diversification," Journal of Finance, 32 (Sept. 1977), pp. 1049-55.
Bergsten, C. Fred, Thomas Horst, and Theodore H. Moran, American Multinationals
and AmericanInterests,Washington, D.C. The Brookings Institution, 1978.
Caves, R.E., "International Corporations: The Industrial Economics of Foreign
Investment," Economica, 38 (Februaru 1971), pp. 1-27.
Corden, W.M., Trade Policy and Economic Welfare, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1974.
Dornbusch, Rudiger, and Paul Krugman, "Flexible Exchange Rates in the Short-Run,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, (Vol. 3, 1976), pp. 537-584.
Gruber, W., D. Mehta, and R. Vernon, "The R EjUFactor in International Trade and
International Investment of U.S. Industries," Journal of Political Economy,
1975 (January-February 1967), pp. 20-37.
Hartman, D.G., "International Capital Flows and the U.S. Economy," National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, 1978.
Horst, Thomas, "Firm and Industry Determinants of the Decision to Invest Abroad:
An Empirical Study," Review of Economics and Statistics, 54 (August 1972 ),
pp.258-266.
Hymer, S., The International Operation of National Firms: A Study in Direct Foreign
Investment, Ph.D. dissertation, M.I.T., 1960.
Jasay, A.E., "The Social Choice Between Home and Overseas Investment," Economic
Journal, 70 (March 1960), pp. 70-105.
Jones, R.E., "International Capital Movements and the Theory of Tariffs and Trade,"
quarterly Journal of Economics, 81 (February l967),pp. 1-38.
4rugman, Paul R.,, "Purchasing Power Parity and Exchange Rates," Journal of
International Economics 8 (August 1978), pp. 397-408.
MacDougall, G.D.A., "The Benefits andCostsof Private Investment From Abroad:
A Theoretical Approach," Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of
Statistics, 22 (August 1960), pp. 189-211.
Musgrave, P.B., United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income: Issues and
Arguments,Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Law School International Tax Program, 1969.
_____________DirectInvestment Abroad and the Multinationals: Effects on the
United States Economy, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Print, 94th Con-
gress, 1st Session, August 1975.
Rugman, A.M.., "Risk, Direct Investment and International Diversification,"
Weltwirtschaftljches Archly, Band 113, Heft 3, 1977, pp. 487-500.18
Thurow, L.C., "International Factor Movements and the American Distribution of
Income," Interniountain Economic Review, vol. II, no. 1 (Spring 1976),
pp. 13-24.
Vernon, Raymond, "International Investment and International Trade in the Product
Cycle," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 30 (May 1966), pp. 190-207.